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DE RUEHMN #0048 0321345
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011345Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7909

UNCLAS MONTEVIDEO 000048

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DS, DS/DSS, DSS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/WHA, DS/EX/PPB,
DS/OSAC, FSI/LMS/CMT FOR RUTH ABRAMSON

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: ASEC KCRM UY

SUBJECT: ANNUAL CRIME EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE (ACEQ) -
SPRING 2008

REF: STATE 07551

¶1. Annual Crime Evaluation Questionnaire - the following
responses are keyed to REFTEL 07551.

2. Crime Mobility (into Emboff neighborhoods):

¶1A. Criminal elements roam freely day or night and target
Emboff and affluent residential areas for burglary.

¶13. Crime Ambiance (around Emboff neighborhoods):

¶1A. Within walking distance (approximately one mile), in
which bands of criminals freely operate and where street and
residential crimes frequently result in violence to residents.

¶13. Aggressiveness of Criminals:

¶1A. Commit street crimes and burglaries but rely on stealth
during burglaries.

¶15. Arming of Criminals

Criminal perpetrators usually are:

¶1A. Armed with knives or lethal cutting weapons.

¶16. Aggregation of Criminals

Criminal perpetrators usually:

¶1A. Operate in groups of two to four individuals, are
prepared to be confrontational, but generally avoid
gratuitous violence.

¶17. Deterrence/Response of Police:

¶1A. Local police or neighborhood associations are totally
ineffective in deterring or disrupting burglaries and other
crimes in Emboff neighborhoods and seldom are able to
apprehend or arrest suspects after the fact.

¶18. Training/Professionalism of Police:

¶1A. Police are mediocre in professionalism and training; they
are somewhat apathetic toward post residential security
requirements, including response to alarms and investigation
of incidents in Emboff neighborhoods. They have definite
resource/manpower limitations that inhibit their deterrence
or response effectiveness.

¶19. Minimize considered.

Baxter